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Mental Disorder and the Civil/Criminal Distinction
Grant H. Morris *

I. Introduction
In his song, “Ring Them Bells,”1 Bob Dylan sounds an alarm. “The shepherd is
asleep,” he tells us, “and the mountains are filled with lost sheep.” Dylan recites a litany of
disastrous consequences that can only be averted if the faithful are awakened and renew
their faith. The final line of that song is particularly disturbing: “And they’re breaking down
the distance between right and wrong.”
This essay discusses one instance in which the distance between right and wrong has
broken down. It is the evaporating distinction between sentence-serving convicts and
mentally disordered nonconvicts who are involved in, or who were involved in, the criminal
process–people we label as both bad and mad. By examining one Supreme Court case from
each of the decades that follow the opening of the University of San Diego School of Law,
the essay demonstrates how the promise that nonconvict mentally disordered persons
would be treated equally with other civilly committed mental patients was made and then

*

Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law; Clinical Professor,
Department of Psychiatry, School of Medicine, University of California, San Diego
1

BOB DYLAN, Ring Them Bells, on OH MERCY ALBUM (CBS Records Inc. 1989).
-1-

https://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art18

2

Morris:

broken.
II. The 1960s: Baxstrom v. Herold2–The Promise Made
On May 17, 1954, only six weeks after the University of San Diego School of Law
commenced operations,3 the United States Supreme Court decided the historic case of
Brown v. Board of Education.4 To the question: “Does segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’
factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational
opportunities?,” the unanimous Court responded: “We believe that it does.”5 Such
segregation deprives minority group children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
them by the Fourteenth Amendment.6 With simple elegance, Chief Justice Warren, writing
for the Court, declared: “Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”7
The right of similarly situated persons to be treated equally before the law is not

2

383 U.S. 107 (1966).

3

The University of San Diego School of Law commenced operations on April 5,

1954.
4

347 U.S. 483 (1954)

5

Id. at 493.

6

Id. at 495. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1.
7

Id. Although Rosa Park’s arrest in Montgomery, Alabama on December 1, 1955
for refusing to stand to allow a white bus rider to take her seat is generally regarded as the
event that started the civil rights revolution, Brown’s promise that the law will treat equally
persons of different races presaged Ms. Parks’ arrest by eighteen months.
-2-
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limited to persons of different races. Nonconvict mental patients, for example, are
similarly situated with each other and cannot be treated as convicts. In its 1966 decision in
Baxstrom v. Herold,8 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a New York statute that
authorized, through administrative decision, the civil commitment of mentally ill, sentenceexpiring convicts and their continued confinement in a maximum security mental
institution operated by the Department of Correction. 9 Under the invalidated statute,
sentence-expiring convicts were the only persons subject to civil commitment who were
denied a jury review on the question of whether their mental condition met the civil
commitment criteria. They were also the only persons who were denied court hearings on
the question of whether they were dangerously mentally ill, a prerequisite for confinement
in a maximum security mental institution.10
Writing for a unanimous Court,11 Chief Justice Warren rejected the assertion that a
person’s criminal tendencies or dangerous propensities are established by his or her past
criminal record.12 Equal protection “demands”13 that sentence-expiring convicts receive the
same procedural safeguards that all others receive in the civil commitment process; they

8

383 U.S. 107 (1966).

9

Id. at 110-11.

10

Id. at 110-13.

11

Justice Black concurred in the result but wrote no opinion. Id. at 115.

12

Id. at 114.

13

“Demands” is the word choice of the Chief Justice. Id. at 115.
-3-
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cannot be specially classified to avoid the standard procedural roadblocks to civil
commitment.14 Equal protection also demands that they receive the same procedural
safeguards that all other civilly committed patients receive before they may be placed in
maximum security confinement; they cannot be specially classified to avoid the standard
roadblocks to such placement.15 “[T]here is no conceivable basis,” wrote the Chief Justice,
“for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from
all other civil commitments.”16
Although the Baxstrom Court considered only a sentence-expiring convict’s right
to procedural protections in the civil commitment process and in decisions to place the
patient in maximum security confinement,17 just six years later, the Court construed its
Baxstrom precedent broadly, stating: “Baxstrom held that the State cannot withhold from a
few the procedural protections or the substantive requirements for commitment that are

14

Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 110.

15

Id. at 110.

16

Id. at 111-12 (1966).

17

See also Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972). In Humphrey, the Supreme
Court applied its Baxstrom precedent to an individual convicted of the misdemeanor of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor. In lieu of a one-year maximum sentence, he
was committed pursuant to the Wisconsin Sex Crime Act to the sex deviate facility in the
state prison for a potentially indefinite period, i.e., initial commitment for a period equal to
the maximum sentence followed by renewable five-year commitment periods. Id. at 506,
507. The Court ruled that petitioner’s contention that he was denied equal protection in the
renewal commitment, which did not accord him a jury trial accorded other persons
undergoing civil commitment, was substantial enough to warrant an evidentiary hearing in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding. Id. at 508.
-4-
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available to all others.”18 If convicts were to be civilly committed upon expiration of their
criminal sentences, the state was required to use the same civil commitment statutes–the
same procedures and same criteria–used to civilly commit any other person, and to commit
them to mental hospitals in which all other civilly committed patients were placed, not in a
facility administered by the Department of Correction. Sentence-expiring convicts could
not be separately categorized for civil commitment purposes.19 After all, when a prisoner’s

18

Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 727 (emphasis added).

19

As a result of the Baxstrom decision, nearly one thousand sentence-expiring
prisoners were discharged from confinement under the unconstitutional law that mandated
their placement in maximum security mental hospitals administered by the New York State
Department of Correction. Almost all of the 992 Baxstrom patients were civilly
committed–using the criteria and procedures applicable to all others who were civilly
committed–and placed in mental hospitals administered by the New York State Department
of Mental Hygiene. Within a six-month period, 79 were discharged to the community, 22
were conditionally released on convalescent care, 273 were reclassified to voluntary
patient status, and 24 were reclassified to informal patient status. Only six had to be
retransferred to maximum security hospitals operated by the Department of Corrections as
dangerously mentally ill. Within the following six months, an additional sixty-eight
Baxstrom patients were discharged and only one was retransferred to a maximum security
hospital. Grant H. Morris, “Criminality” and the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
784, 795 (1969). The results strongly suggest that psychiatrists in the Department of
Mental Hygiene: (1) overpredicted dangerous mental illness, (2) were unwilling to accept
and treat as mental patients those who were identified as “dangerous” or labeled as
“criminals,” and (3) had the ability to treat such patients when they were integrated with and
given treatment indistinguishable from that provided to other civilly committed mental
patients. Id. at 796. See also HENRY J. STEADMAN & JOSEPH J. COCOZZA, CAREERS OF
THE CRIMINALLY INSANE 55-161 (1974) (finding that the Baxstrom patients were not very
dangerous and were successfully treated in civil mental hospitals, id. at 108, and that when
released to the community, few displayed dangerous behavior, id. at 158); Grant H. Morris,
The Confusion of Confinement Syndrome: An Analysis of the Confinement of Mentally
Ill Criminals and Ex-Criminals by the Department of Correction of the State of New
York, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 651, 670-75 (1968) [hereinafter Morris, Confusion of
Confinement].
-5-
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sentence expires, his or her debt to society has been paid, and the prisoner is no longer
subject to further punishment.
Although Baxstrom was decided almost forty years ago, it is not just a viable
precedent, it is a venerable precedent. Baxstrom has been cited in 505 court decisions,
including nineteen Supreme Court decisions.20
III. The 1970s: Jackson v. Indiana21–The Promise Extended
Prior to 1972, criminal defendants found mentally incompetent to stand trial, i.e.,
unable to understand the criminal proceedings against them or to assist in their defense,22
20

See Westlaw Keycite for Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (examined on
December 22, 2003). The Supreme Court most recently cited Baxstrom in Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369-70 (1997). Justice Thomas, who wrote the Court’s majority
opinion in Hendricks, cited Baxstrom, as did Justice Kennedy, who wrote a concurring
opinion. Id. at 372 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See infra text accompanying notes 112-16.
21

406 U.S. 715 (1972).

22

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §4241 (2000). The Supreme Court has ruled that the
prohibition against conducting a criminal trial of an incompetent defendant “is fundamental
to an adversary system of justice.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975). The
suspension of criminal proceedings is warranted to assure the accuracy, fairness, and
dignity of the trial process and to justify the imposition of punishment if the defendant is
convicted. In many cases, the accused may be the only individual who has knowledge of the
facts underlying the criminal charge, and thus, an accurate assessment of guilt requires the
defendant’s assistance. To assure fairness in the criminal process, the accused must have
the basic capacity to assist counsel in presenting a defense. The dignity of the criminal
process would be undermined by the spectacle of an incompetent defendant’s trial. The
objective of punishment requires that a convicted defendant comprehend the reasons why
the court is imposing punishment. Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. REV.
454, 457-59 (1967); Barbara A. Weiner, Mental Disability and the Criminal Law, in
AMERICAN BAR FOUND., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 693, 694 (Samuel J.
Brakel et al. eds. 3d ed. 1985). The suspension of criminal proceedings against
incompetent defendants is “a by-product of the ban against trial in absentia; the mentally
-6-
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were confined until their competence was restored.23 For many, “a finding of
incompetence to stand trial was tantamount to a life sentence.”24 However, in Jackson v.
Indiana,25 the Supreme Court, again in a unanimous26 decision, invalidated a statute
permitting indeterminate, and potentially life-time, commitment of a mentally retarded,
deaf-mute person who had been found incompetent to stand trial. 27 The Court ruled that its
six-year old Baxstrom principle was not limited to sentence-expiring convicts but applies
as well to mentally incompetent criminal defendants: “If criminal conviction and

incompetent defendant, though physically present in the courtroom, is in reality afforded
no opportunity to defend himself.” Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of
Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 832, 834 (1960).
23

A 1965 study of Matteawan State hospital, a maximum security institution
administered by the New York State Department of Correction, revealed that 208 of the
1062 mentally incompetent defendants at that facility had been detained there for twenty
years or more. SPECIAL COMM. ON THE STUDY OF COMMITMENT PROCEDURES AND THE
LAW RELATING TO INCOMPETENTS, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
MENTAL ILLNESS, DUE PROCESS AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT 73 (1968). The patient
longest in residence at Matteawan at that time was an eighty-three-year-old patient who had
been accused of burglary in 1901 and who had been found mentally incompetent to stand
trial. Id. at 72. After sixty-four years of confinement at Matteawan, he was, at least
theoretically, still awaiting restoration to competence so that he could undergo a criminal
trial.
24

Grant H. Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil
Commitment of Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1,
4 (1993).
25

406 U.S. 715 (1972).

26

Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the Court’s
consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 741.
27

Id. at 717-19, 738.
-7-
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imposition of sentence are insufficient to justify less procedural and substantive protection
against indefinite commitment than that generally available to all others, the mere filing of
criminal charges surely cannot suffice.”28 Equal protection is denied when incompetent
criminal defendants are subjected to a more lenient commitment standard (i.e.,
incompetence to stand criminal trial) and to a more stringent release standard (i.e.,
restoration of trial competence) than is applicable to all other persons who are not charged
with crimes and who could only be detained under the state’s civil commitment laws.29
Although the finding of incompetence to stand trial may justify a brief period of
detention designed to restore the defendant’s competence, due process requires that
incompetent defendants who cannot soon be restored to competency either must be
released or be subjected to “the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be
required to commit indefinitely any other citizen.”30 Although the Court declined to
specify when civil commitment or release must occur, the Court noted that detention of
incompetent defendants is appropriate only for those who “probably soon will be able to
stand trial.”31 And even for those defendants, the Court required that commitment “must be

28

Id. at 724.

29

Id. at 730.

30

Id. at 738.

31

Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. An incompetent defendant can only be held for a
“reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability
that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.” Id. If such probability does not
exist, the defendant must be released or civilly committed. If such probability does exist,
the defendant may be detained for a limited time to attempt to restore his or her
-8-
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justified by progress toward that goal.”32
Although Jackson was decided more than thirty years ago, it, too, is not just a viable
precedent, it is a venerable precedent. Jackson has been cited in 636 court decisions,
including twenty-five Supreme Court decisions.33
IV. The 1980s: Jones v. United States34–The Promise Broken
If sentence-expiring convicts and permanently incompetent criminal defendants
cannot be specially classified for civil commitment purposes, it is logical to assume that
any nonconvict cannot be specially classified for that purpose–even if the individual has
been involved in the criminal process. In Jackson, the Supreme Court noted that the
Baxstrom principle had been extended to post-trial commitment decisions involving
individuals who had been absolved from criminal responsibility by insanity verdicts.35 A
successful insanity defense precludes criminal responsibility. A seriously mentally

competency. Id.
32

Id.

33

See Westlaw Keycite for Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (examined on
December 22, 2003). The Supreme Court most recently cited Jackson in Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (noting that when detention's goal is no longer practically
attainable, detention no longer “bear[s][a] reasonable relation to the purpose for which the
individual [was] committed.” Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738). In 2003, Justice Souter, joined by
Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsberg, wrote a dissenting opinion that cited Jackson for the
same principle. Demore v. Hyung Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1726, 1732 (2003)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
34

463 U.S. 354 (1983).

35

Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 724 (1972).
-9-
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disordered person who engages in criminal behavior but who is found not guilty of the
crime because of that disorder is not blameworthy and is not subject to criminal
punishment.
Relying upon Baxstrom, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,36
and the highest appellate courts in several states,37 held that an insanity verdict could not by
itself justify the indeterminate detention of an insanity acquittee. Although a finding of
insanity at the time of the criminal act warrants a post-trial evaluation of the acquittee’s
current mental condition, once that evaluation is completed, the acquittee should not be
distinguished from other nonconvict mentally disordered persons in the criteria applied to
the commitment decision and the procedures employed in the commitment process.38
36

Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Chief Judge David Bazelon,
writing for the court, relied on Baxstrom as establishing the principle that “the commission
of criminal acts does not give rise to a presumption of dangerousness which, standing
alone, justifies substantial difference in commitment procedures and confinement
conditions for the mentally ill.” Id. at 647. To confine an insanity acquittee without
affording him the standard civil commitment procedural protections denies him equal
protection. Id. at 652. The court rejected the argument, which the Supreme Court also
rejected in Baxstrom, that expeditious commitment of nonconvict mentally ill persons is
justified because of their dangerous or criminal propensities. Id. at 649.
37

See, e.g., State v. Clemons, 515 P.2d 324, 328-29 (Ariz. 1973); Wilson v. State,
287 N.E.2d 875, 881 (Ind. 1972); People v. McQuillan, 221 N.W.2d 569, 579-80, 586
(Mich. 1974); People v. Lally, 224 N.E.2d 87, 92 (N.Y. 1966); State v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289,
296-99 (N.J. 1975); State ex rel. Kovach v. Schubert, 219 N.W.2d 341, 346-47 (Wis.
1974), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1117, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1130 (1975).
38

See generally Grant H. Morris, Dealing Responsibly with the Criminally
Irresponsible, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 855 (asserting that although insanity acquittees can be
subjected to a post-trial evaluation to assess their current mental condition, they should not
be distinguished from other nonconvict mentally disordered persons in commitment,
release, and treatment decisions).
-10-
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Nevertheless, in its 1983 decision in Jones v. United States,39 a narrowly divided
Supreme Court held that “insanity acquittees constitute a special class that [can] be treated
differently from other candidates for commitment.”40 As a special class, insanity
acquittees can be subjected to automatic, indeterminate commitment 41 without first
undergoing the civil commitment process. For civil commitment generally, the state is
required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the person is both mentally ill and
dangerous.42 According to the five-judge Jones majority, the state has no such burden for
insanity acquittee commitment. In his criminal trial, Jones pleaded insanity as a defense to
the crime charged against him.43 The insanity verdict established beyond a reasonable doubt
that he committed a criminal act and did so because of mental illness.44 The legislature
may determine that the insanity verdict supports an inference of continuing mental illness45

39

463 U.S. 354 (1983).

40

Id. at 370.

41

The District of Columbia statute interpreted in the Jones case provided, and
continues to provide, that within fifty days of commitment, a judicial hearing shall be held
at which the insanity acquittee can prove his or her eligibility for release. D.C. CODE § 24501(d)(2)(A) (2001). At that hearing, the burden is placed on the insanity acquittee to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he has recovered his sanity and will not in the
reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others. Id. § 24-501(d)(2)(B), (e).
42

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979).

43

Jones, 463 U.S. at 359-60.

44

Id. at 363.

45

Id. at 366.
-11-
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and continuing dangerousness.46 Thus, insanity acquittees can be distinguished from others,
such as incompetent criminal defendants, about whom such proof is lacking.47

46

Id. at 364. The Jones majority reasoned that proof of the commission of a
criminal act is “concrete evidence” that “may be at least as persuasive as any prediction
about dangerousness that might be made in a civil-commitment proceeding.” Id.
47

The Court distinguished insanity acquittees from persons subjected to the regular
civil commitment process without any criminal charges brought against them and from
criminal defendants found incompetent to stand trial. Incompetent criminal defendants
cannot be committed indefinitely because no affirmative proof has been offered that they
committed criminal acts or were dangerous. Id. at 364 n.12 (discussing Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)).
Some states have enacted statutes that provide for an evidentiary hearing on the
question of a permanently incompetent defendant’s guilt of the crime charged. See, e.g.,
725 ILL. COMP . STAT . ANN. 5/104-25 (West Supp. 2004); N.M. STAT . ANN. § 31-9-1.5
(Michie 2000). If, at that hearing, the defendant is found to have committed a crime, he or
she is subjected to additional treatment without undergoing the civil commitment process.
Some might assert that, consistent with Jones, the determination of factual guilt in the
evidentiary hearing justifies the extended commitment of permanently incompetent
criminal defendants. Such statutes, however, do not conform to the requirements of
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). In Jackson, the Supreme Court declared that the
purpose of committing an incompetent is to determine whether the individual will be
restored to competency in the near future, and if so, to treat the individual toward that end.
Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. No other purpose was identified by the Court in Jackson, and no
other purpose has been identified by the Court since it decided Jackson. Because a factual
finding of guilt is not related to progress in treatment to restore competence, a factual guilt
hearing cannot justify an extended period of treatment. Even if the factual guilt finding
could justify placement of incompetent defendants into a special class for commitment
purposes initially, the special commitment must end when the justification for that
commitment ends. If the incompetent defendant has not progressed toward restoration of
competence, he or she can no longer be committed as an incompetent defendant.
Subsequent commitment of the permanently incompetent defendant, if it is to occur at all,
must be achieved through the customary civil commitment process used to commit any
other citizen. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. See Morris & Meloy, supra note 24, at 18-23
(critiquing the use of evidentiary hearings to establish guilt of permanently incompetent
criminal defendants so that they may be detained without customary civil commitment
proceedings).
-12-
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In a dissenting opinion,48 Justice Brennan challenged the majority’s logic. He noted
that an insanity trial focuses on the defendant’s mental condition in the past, at the time of
the alleged criminal act. The post-trial commitment decision focuses on the defendant’s
mental condition now and in the future. The finding of insanity at the time of the criminal
act simply does not provide an adequate basis from which to infer the present and future
mental condition of the insanity acquittee.49 Insanity acquittees are similarly situated with
sentence-expiring convicts who can “not be treated differently from other candidates for
civil commitment.”50 Just as the state bears the burden of proving that sentence-expiring
convicts and others subjected to the civil commitment process are currently mentally ill
and dangerous, the state should also be obligated to prove the same for insanity acquittees.
Michael Jones, for example, had been charged with shoplifting. If he had been found guilty
of this nonviolent, petit larceny, the maximum sentence that could have been imposed was
one year.51 Instead of that one year of punishment, he faced indeterminate–potentially
lifetime–confinement as an insanity acquittee. Justice Brennan asserted that the Jones
majority did not “purport to overrule Baxstrom or any of the cases which have followed
Baxstrom. It is clear, therefore, that the separate facts of criminality and mental illness

48

Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined in Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion.
Jones, 463 U.S. at 371 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and Justice Stevens wrote a separate
dissent. Id. at 387 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49

See id. at 377 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

50

Id. at 376.

51

Jones, 463 U.S. at 359.
-13-
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cannot support indefinite psychiatric commitment, for both were present in Baxstrom.”52
Michael Perlin has asserted that the Jones majority’s abrupt departure from the
Court’s Baxstrom and Jackson precedents was an overtly political decision designed to
restore the public’s faith in the judicial process.53 He may well be correct. After all, Jones
was decided exactly one year and eight days after the insanity acquittal verdict of John
Hinckley for his attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan.54
V. The 1990s: Kansas v. Hendricks55–The Promise Forgotten
In 1990, the state of Washington enacted the nation’s first Sexually Violent Predator

52

Id. at 380 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992),
the Court held that due process precludes the continued detention of a dangerous, but not
mentally ill, insanity acquittee. Id. at 83. Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion,
also addressed the equal protection issue in a portion of the opinion in which three other
justices joined. Justice White embraced and applied Justice Brennan’s equal protection
analysis in Jones. Because the state did not provide for continuing confinement of
sentence-expiring convicts who may be dangerous when their sentences expire, it may not
continue the confinement of insanity acquittees who may be dangerous but who are no
longer insane. Id. at 85. The state lacked a particularly convincing reason for
discriminating against insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill. Id. at 86. They
are similarly situated with sentence-expiring convicts. Id. at 85. If sentence-expiring
convicts cannot be separately categorized for civil commitment purposes, insanity
acquittees who are no longer mentally ill cannot be so categorized.
53

See Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact of the ADA
on the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L.
REV. 193, 211-12 (2000). See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
INSANITY DEFENSE 333-48 (1994).
54

John W. Hinckley attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan on March 30,
1981. After a lengthy trial, the jury rendered a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity on
June 21, 1982. The Jones case was decided by the Supreme Court on June 29, 1983.
55

521 U.S. 346 (1997)
-14-
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[SVP] legislation.56 Within five years, a handful of states enacted similar, if not virtually
identical, legislation.57 Unlike the sexual psychopath legislation that it replaced,58 SVP
statutes did not merely substitute indeterminate confinement in a mental hospital for

56

See 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.09 (§§
71.09.010-.902) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004)).
57

See ARIZ. REV. STAT . ANN. §§ 36-3701 to -3717 (West 2003) (enacted originally
by 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 257); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600-6609.3 (West 1998
& Supp. 2004) (enacted originally by 1995 Cal. Stat. ch. 763, § 3); KAN. STAT . ANN. §§ 5929a01 to 21 (1994 & Supp. 2003) (enacted originally by 1994 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 316);
MINN. STAT . ANN. § 253B.185 (West 2003) (enacted originally by 1994 Minn. Laws, 1st
Sp. Sess., ch. 1, art. 1, § 3, which defined “sexually dangerous person” in § 253B.02 (18c));
WIS. STAT . ANN. §§ 980.01–.13 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003) (enacted originally by 1993
Wis. Laws 479, § 40). After the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of SVP legislation in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), several more states
enacted SVP legislation. See infra note 85.
58

Forty years ago, sexual psychopath legislation had been enacted in more than half
the states. Weiner, supra note 22, at 739. Through such legislation, criminal defendants
charged with or convicted of sex crimes and facing a determinate sentence could be
detained indefinitely for treatment until they were no longer dangerous. See id. at 740-41.
Sexual psychopath legislation was discredited, however, by the inability of psychiatrists and
other mental health professionals to identify a specific mental disorder experienced by
individuals who should be included within the targeted group and by the lack of successful
treatment methodologies to improve their condition. Id. at 741-43. The absence of
treatment destroyed any valid basis for distinguishing sexual psychopath prisoners from
other prisoners in order to subject them to indeterminate commitment. Millard v. Cameron,
373 F.2d 468, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Sexual psychopath legislation was also challenged as violating procedural due
process. For example, in Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), a unanimous Supreme
Court ruled that the possibility of indeterminate confinement based on a new finding of
fact–that the person constitutes a threat of bodily harm to the public, or is a habitual
offender and mentally ill–entitled the person subjected to commitment under Colorado’s
Sex Offenders Act to the full panoply of due process protections, including the right to
counsel, to have an opportunity to be heard, to be confronted with witnesses, to crossexamine, to offer evidence of his own, and to have findings adequate to make a meaningful
appeal. Specht, 386 U.S. at 609-10.
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determinate punishment in a prison; rather, it added indeterminate confinement upon
completion of the offender’s criminal sentence.
In 1997, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Kansas’s SVP Act59
against three claims of constitutional infirmity.60 Under the Kansas statute, a sentenceexpiring convict could be civilly committed as an SVP if he had a “mental abnormality” or a
“personality disorder” that made him “likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual
violence.”61 In Kansas v. Hendricks,62 the Court held that the Act satisfied substantive due
process requirements.63 Justice Thomas, writing for the Court’s five-justice majority,
noted that civil commitment statutes have been sustained when they limit the class of
persons eligible for confinement to those who, because of mental illness, are dangerous
and who are unable to control their dangerousness.64 Although the Kansas statute used the
term “mental abnormality” rather than “mental illness,” Justice Thomas dismissed the

59

KAN. STAT . ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 21 (1994 & Supp. 2003) (enacted originally by
1994 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 316).
60

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997).

61

KAN. STAT . ANN. §§ 59-29a02(a) & 59-29a07 (Supp. 2003). As originally
enacted, and as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Hendricks, the statute defining SVPs
referred to “predatory act of sexual violence.” Act of May 19, 1994, ch. 316, § 2, 1994
Kan. Sess. Laws 316 . The statute has been amended and now refers to “repeat acts of
sexual violence.” KAN. STAT . ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (Supp. 2003).
62

521 U.S. 346, 356-60 (1997).

63

Id. at 356-60. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides that no state “shall deprive any
person of . . . liberty without due process of law.”
64

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.
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importance of the distinction, declaring that “the term ‘mental illness’ is devoid of any
talismanic significance.”65 The legislature may define terms of a medical nature for legal
purposes and need not mirror the definitions of the medical profession.66
The majority also found that the Act did not violate the Constitution’s prohibition
against double jeopardy67 or ex post facto lawmaking.68 The Court accepted as true the
legislature’s stated intention to create a new civil commitment scheme for SVPs, rather
than to inflict additional punishment for past criminal acts.69 Hendricks failed to prove that
the legislation was punitive either in purpose or effect.70 Incapacitation71–depriving the

65

Id. at 359. Justice Thomas used, without attribution, language employed by the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin two years earlier. In a decision upholding the
constitutionality of Wisconsin’s SVP statutes, that court stated: “[T]here is no talismanic
significance that should be given to the term ‘mental illness.’” State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d
115, 122 (1995), cert. denied, Post v. Wisconsin, 521 U.S. 1118 (1997).
66

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359.

67

Id. at 360-70. U.S. CONST. amend. V, made applicable to the states through U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”
68

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 370-71. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3, made applicable to
the states through U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, provides that no “ex post facto Law shall be
passed.”
69

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. But see State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 135 (1995)
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, Post v. Wisconsin, 521 U.S. 1118 (1997). In
dissenting from a pre-Hendricks Wisconsin Supreme court decision upholding the
constitutionality of that state’s SVP statutes, Justice Shirley Abrahamson asserted, “If
reference to treatment were sufficient to render a statute civil, [Wisconsin’s statutes that
govern] prisons and jails, would be transmogrified into a civil statute.” Id. at 137.
70

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. In finding that the SVP Act was not proven to have a
punitive purpose, the majority noted that, unlike a criminal statute, the Act did “not affix
-17-
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dangerously mentally ill of their freedom–is a “legitimate nonpunitive governmental
objective.”72 Thus, even if SVPs suffer from an untreatable condition, they may be detained
so long as they pose a danger to others.73 If treatment is possible, the fact that the state
provides treatment only incidentally to its primary incapacitation objective, does not render
the statutes punitive.74 Because the Act was found to have a nonpunitive purpose, neither a
double jeopardy nor an ex post facto claim could be sustained.75 Hendricks was not
subjected to multiple punishments because SVP civil commitment is neither punishment
that follows a second prosecution for the same crime for which he served a criminal
sentence,76 nor punishment for conduct that was legal before the statutes were enacted.77

culpability for prior criminal conduct,” id. at 362, and did not require scienter for
commitment. Id. The Act did not function as a deterrent because those committed as SVPs
are unable to exercise control over their behavior and are “unlikely to be deterred by the
threat of confinement.” Id. at 362-63. Additionally, SVPs experience essentially the same
conditions experienced by other civilly committed persons, not the more restrictive
conditions experienced by prisoners. Id. at 363. The Act’s use of criminal process-type
procedural safeguards to identify those who are civilly committable did not convert the
proceedings into criminal proceedings. Id. at 363.
71

Id. at 365.

72

Id. at 363.

73

Id. at 365-66.

74

Id. at 366-67.

75

Id. at 369.

76

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369.

77

Id. at 371. Although Justice Kennedy joined in the Court’s majority, he wrote a
short concurring opinion expressing his concern about the use of civil commitment laws to
confine those who have already been punished through the criminal process. Id. at 371-72
-18-
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Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion. Three of the four dissenting justices
agreed with the majority that a state may enact separate civil commitment statutes
applicable to different categories of committable individuals.78 Hendricks could be civilly
committed as an SVP because he suffered from a mental disorder–pedophilia–and lacked
the ability to control his dangerous actions.79 Without considering separately whether
substantive due process requires the state “to provide treatment that it concedes is
potentially available to a person whom it concedes is treatable,”80 the four dissenters
focused on the ex post facto claim that posed the same issue.81 In their view, the statutes
impermissibly imposed punishment by delaying treatment until Hendricks completed his
prison sentence.82 Under the Act, diagnosis, evaluation, and commitment
proceedings–prerequisites for treatment–did not occur until the convict’s criminal
sentence was about to expire. Additionally, when commitment proceedings were

(Kennedy, J., concurring). He cautioned that if civil confinement is used to achieve
retribution or general deterrence rather than mere incapacitation, it cannot be validated. Id.
at 373. If “mental abnormality” proves too uncertain a category to justify civil
commitment, its use cannot be condoned. Id.
78

Id. at 377 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsberg did not join in this portion of
Justice Breyer’s opinion and wrote no separate opinion expressing the reasons for her
decision. Id. at 373.
79

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 374-77.

80

Id. at 378 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

81

Id. at 378.

82

Id. at 381.
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conducted, the decision maker was not required to consider less restrictive alternatives to
confinement.83 And when Hendricks was civilly committed as an SVP, the record supported
the Kansas Supreme Court’s finding that the state did not provide treatment.84
Although the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of SVP
legislation by the narrowest of margins, many states responded quickly to the Hendricks
decision by enacting SVP legislation.85 More can be expected to join them. 86 To avoid

83

Id. at 387.

84

Id. at 390 (noting that the Kansas Supreme Court found that Hendricks was
untreated, not that he was untreatable). See also id. at 392 (finding that “Kansas was not
providing treatment to Hendricks.”). Under such circumstances, the dissenters agreed with
the Kansas Supreme Court’s finding that the treatment provisions of the statutes were
“somewhat disingenuous.” Id. at 393, citing In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan.
1966).
85

See, e.g., FLA. STAT . ANN. §§ 394.910–.931 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); 725 ILL.
COMP . STAT . ANN. §§ 207/1-207/99 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
229A.1–16 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004); MO. REV. STAT . §§ 632.483–.513 (Vernon 2000
& Supp. 2004); N.J. STAT . ANN. §§ 30:4-27.24 to .38 (West Supp. 2004); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 44-48-10 to -170 (Law. Co-op. 2002); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.001.150 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-70.1 to .19 (Michie Supp. 2003).
The Illinois statutes were enacted one week after Hendricks was decided. 1997 Ill. Laws
90-40 (approved June 30, 1997, effective Jan. 1, 1998). North Dakota enacted its SVP
statutes on April 8, 1997, two months prior to the Hendricks decision, although the statutes
became effective more than a month after Hendricks was decided. 1997 N.D. Laws ch.
243, § 1 (approved and filed Apr. 8, 1997, effective Aug. 1, 1997, and codified as N.D.
CENT . CODE §§ 25-03.3-01 to -23 (2002).
86

In Hendricks, thirty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and three territories
joined in an amicus brief supporting Kansas’s position that SVP legislation is an
appropriate and constitutional method to protect citizens from sexually dangerous persons.
Amicus Curie Brief of the States of Washington et al. at 2, Hendricks (No. 95-1649). The
brief addressed the substantive due process issue. The state of Wisconsin wrote a separate
amicus brief addressing ex post facto and double jeopardy issues. Amicus Curie Brief of
Wisconsin, Hendricks (No. 95-1649 & 95-9075). The multi-state brief expressed its
-20-
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constitutional problems, the legislation typically mimics the Kansas model.87 SVP statutes

approval of, and expressly adopted, Wisconsin’s arguments. Amicus Curie Brief of the
States of Washington et al. at 2, Hendricks (No. 95-1649).
87

For example, many of the statutes begin with a declaration borrowed, nearly
verbatim, from the Washington and Kansas models:
The legislature finds that a small but extremely dangerous group of
sexually violent predators exist who do not have a mental disease or
defect that renders them appropriate for [the existing involuntary civil
commitment law], which is intended to be a short-term civil
commitment system that is primarily designed to provide short-term
treatment to individuals with serious mental disorders and then return
them to the community. In contrast to persons appropriate for civil
commitment . . . , sexually violent predators generally have
personality disorders and/or mental abnormalities which are
unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities and those
conditions render them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior.
The legislature further finds that [SVPs’] likelihood of engaging in
repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is high. The existing
involuntary commitment [laws are] inadequate to address the risk [of
reoffense]. The legislature further finds that the prognosis for curing
[SVPs] is poor, the treatment needs of this population are very long
term, and the treatment modalities for this population are very
different than the traditional treatment modalities for people
appropriate for commitment under [the existing involuntary civil
commitment law].
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2002). See also KAN. STAT . ANN. § 59-29a01
(Supp. 2003). States that begin their SVP Acts with a similar statement of legislative
findings include: 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 257, § 10 (the legislature’s findings are found
in the notes to ARIZ. REV. STAT . ANN. § 36-3701 (West 2003)); 1995 Cal. Stat. ch. 763, §
3 (the legislature’s findings are found in the historical and statutory notes to CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 6600 (West 1998)); FLA. STAT . ANN. § 394.910 (West 2002); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 229A.1 (West Supp. 2004); N.J. STAT . ANN. § 30:4-27.25 (West Supp. 2004); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-48-20 (Law. Co-op. 2002); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
841.001 (West 2003).
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have joined lengthened criminal sentences and sex offender registration laws88 as
politically expedient controls on those who have committed violent sexual offenses and
who might do so again in the future.
In Hendricks, the Supreme Court did not consider whether special civil commitment
legislation for SVPs violates the equal protection clause. In fact, the words “equal
protection” do not appear even once in Justice Thomas’s majority opinion, in Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion, or in Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion.89 But given the
Court’s rejection of Hendricks’s substantive due process argument, it is unlikely that the
88

See, e.g., N.J. STAT . ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -11 (West 1995 & Supp. 2003).

89

Leroy Hendricks did raise an equal protection claim in his cross-petition to the
Supreme Court. Conditional Cross-Petition, Kansas v. Hendricks (No. 95-9075),
available in microfiche format. However, his brief as cross-petitioner did not argue the
equal protection claim. In a footnote, the cross-petitioner stated: “Mr. Hendricks’ crosspetition also sought review of his equal protection challenge to the statute. This claim will
be subsumed in his substantive due process argument, and will not be separately briefed.”
Brief for Leroy Hendricks Cross-Petitioner, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075),
available at 1996 WL 450661, at *2 n.1. In the brief submitted by Kansas as crossrespondent, Kansas asserted that Hendricks abandoned his equal protection claim by failing
to argue its merits in his cross-petitioner’s brief and requested that the Court so rule. Brief
of Cross-Respondent, Hendricks (No. 95-9075), available at 1996 WL 509502, at *4,
39-40. The state characterized this failure as an apparent attempt to evade the page-limit
requirements established by Supreme Court rule “or to manipulate the briefing process” by
forcing the state either to address first the equal protection claim that Hendricks alone had
raised or to wait until the state’s final reply brief to respond. Brief of Cross-Respondent,
Hendricks (No. 95-9075), available at 1996 WL 509502, at *40. In his reply brief for
cross-petitioner, Hendricks did not address the state’s argument. See Reply Brief for
Cross-Petitioner, Hendricks (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075), available at 1996 WL 593579.
The Supreme Court did not discuss the question of whether Hendricks’s equal
protection claim could be appropriately subsumed within his substantive due process
argument or comment on the state’s request for a ruling that Hendricks had abandoned his
equal protection claim. The Court merely noted that Hendricks’s cross-petition asserted
double jeopardy and ex post facto claims. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350.
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Court would have accepted an equal protection argument that equated SVPs with other
civilly committed mental patients.90 The Hendricks majority found that the legislature may
identify for civil commitment purposes “a limited subclass of dangerous persons.”91 The
Kansas SVP Act met that requirement by restricting SVP commitment to individuals who
have a mental abnormality or personality disorder that they are unable to control and that
renders them likely to engage in predatory92 acts of sexual violence.93 SVPs are more
dangerous as a group than are other civilly committed mental patients. An equal protection
argument that SVPs are no more dangerous than, and therefore are similarly situated with,
other civilly committed patients is likely to fail.94
Nevertheless, because SVP legislation is applicable, not to all persons who can be
categorized as SVPs, but only to some, such legislation may be vulnerable to an equal

90

See Grant H. Morris, The Evil That Men Do: Perverting Justice to Punish
Perverts, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1213-17 (asserting that an equal protection argument
that SVPs are similarly situated with other civilly committed patients will not succeed).
91

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997).

92

After the decision in Hendricks, the Kansas legislature amended the statute to
require a likelihood of “repeat” acts of sexual violence instead of “predatory” acts of sexual
violence. See supra note 61.
93

Id. at 358.

94

Even three of the four dissenting justices agreed that Kansas was not
constitutionally prohibited from adopting two separate civil commitment statutes “each
covering somewhat different classes of committable individuals.” Id. at 377 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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protection attack.95 Typically, SVP legislation does not authorize civil commitment of all
those who suffer from a mental disorder, no matter how narrowly or broadly defined, and
who are likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. Rather, SVP commitment is
limited only to persons who fit within one of three groups and who are about to be released
from confinement: sentence-expiring convicts, persons found mentally incompetent to
stand trial, and insanity acquittees.96
Individuals who do not fit into one of these three categories are not subject to SVP
commitment even if they are equally likely to engage in sexually violent conduct and are
unable to control their dangerousness due to mental abnormality or personality disorder.
Thus, for example, ex-convicts who were punished for sexually violent crimes and who
could be predicted to commit additional sexually violent crimes are not subject to SVP
commitment if they already served their criminal sentences and were released from
confinement before the SVP Act was enacted. Criminal defendants who are charged with,
but not yet convicted of, sexually violent crimes and who could be predicted to commit
additional sexually violent crimes are not subject to SVP commitment. Criminal
defendants who are charged with violent crimes, but not sexually violent crimes, are not
subject to SVP commitment. Individuals who have not yet been charged with sexually

95

See Morris, supra note 90, at 1217-27 (asserting that an equal protection claim
may be successful if it demonstates that sentence-expiring convicts and others who may be
identified as SVPs and subjected to SVP commitment are similarly situated with other
persons identifiable as SVPs but not subject to SVP commitment).
96

See KAN. STAT . ANN. §§ 59-29a03, -29a04 (Supp.2003).
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violent crimes, and indeed, individuals who have not yet committed such crimes, are not
subject to SVP commitment. And yet, in each case, their mental abnormalities or
personality disorders and their difficulty in controlling their sexual urges may make them
equally dangerous with those who are about to be released from confinement and who have
been legislatively targeted for special SVP commitment.97 Although the Supreme Court
permits the legislature “to recognize degrees of harm, and it may confine its restrictions to
those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest,”98 the equal protection
clause prohibits the legislature from discriminating between individuals when the danger
that they pose is equal. The state has no compelling interest to so discriminate.

97

Consider, for example, the case of In re Diestelhorst, 716 N.E.2d 823 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1999). A pedophile, who was released after serving a ten-year prison term for
sexually molesting children, attempted to lure a young girl into his car. He was
apprehended and pled guilty to the crime of child abduction. Id. at 824. As his sentence
was expiring, the state petitioned for SVP commitment. Id. at 825. Despite expert
testimony that he had a “lingering penchant for children,” id., the appellate court dismissed
the petition. Child abduction is not a sexually violent offense, and under Illinois law, only
those who are completing confinement for a sexually violent offense are subject to SVP
commitment. Id. at 827. The court rejected the state’s argument that SVP commitment is
appropriate because the crime, although not specifically defined as violent, was sexually
motivated. Id. at 827-29. The perpetrator, according to the state, sought to gratify “an
aberrant sexual preference. He wanted to sexually molest his prey.” Id. at 826. If, as the
court assumed, the state correctly assessed the criminal’s motivation, would anyone
believe that this individual is less sexually dangerous than another pedophile who was not
apprehended until after he sexually molested a child and who was therefore subject to SVP
commitment?
98

Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 275 (1940).
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Baxstrom v. Herold99 and Jackson v. Indiana100 tell us that sentence-expiring
convicts and permanently incompetent criminal defendants cannot be specially classified
for civil commitment purposes. SVP legislation, however, separately categorizes these
individuals for SVP commitment. Baxstrom and Jackson tell us that the same civil
commitment standards and procedures must be applied to sentence-expiring convicts and
permanently incompetent defendants that are applied to any other nonconvicts. SVP
legislation, however, applies different commitment standards and procedures to these
individuals for SVP commitment. If sentence-expiring convicts and permanently
incompetent defendants can only be involuntarily confined as are other civilly committed
patients, then they are civilly committed patients, and cannot be morphed into SVPs or
another special hybrid class of patient with “criminal” as well as “civil” features.
Although Jones v. United States101 tells us that insanity acquittees can be specially
classified for post-criminal trial confinement without undergoing the civil commitment
process,102 their special classification for SVP commitment purposes can not be justified.
Insanity acquittees are not subject to SVP commitment immediately after their criminal
trials, but rather, only after they are about to be released from confinement as insanity

99

383 U.S. 107 (1966). See supra text accompanying notes 8-19.

100

405 U.S. 715 (1972). See supra text accompanying notes 25-32.

101

463 U.S. 354 (1983).

102

See supra text accompanying notes 39-47.
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acquittees.103 Such release does not occur until the acquittee is no longer dangerous, i.e., is
not likely to cause harm to himself or others.104 Thus, an insanity acquittee who currently
suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes him likely to engage
in repeat acts of sexual violence–the definitional criteria for SVP adjudication105–is
unlikely to be released from insanity acquittee commitment as not dangerous. In reality,
insanity acquittees who are not too dangerous to be released from insanity acquittee
confinement but who are dangerous enough to be confined as SVPs do not exist. Insanity
acquittees, therefore, are not a special category for SVP commitment purposes; they are a
noncategory.
Although the Hendricks Court did not consider or resolve an equal protection
challenge, it was well aware of the Baxstrom decision. Baxstrom was discussed and
specifically cited in briefs submitted by the State of Kansas106 and in amicus briefs

103

See, e.g., KAN. STAT . ANN. §§ 59-29a03(a)(3), 04(a) (Supp. 2003).

104

Id. §§ 22-3428(3) (authorizing transfer to a less restrictive hospital environment,
conditional release, or discharge) & 22-3428(7)(a), (b)(B) (defining “mentally ill person”
as one who “is likely to cause harm to self or others” and defining “likely to cause harm to
self or others” as “likely, in the reasonably foreseeable future, to cause substantial physical
injury or physical abuse to self or others or substantial damage to another’s property”). In
many states, insanity acquittees may not be released until a court finds that they are no
longer dangerous to others. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.2(c) (West Supp. 2004).
105

KAN. STAT . ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (Supp. 2003).

106

Brief for Respondent at 46-47, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (No.
95-1649) (asserting that adequate procedural rights are provided in the SVP civil
commitment process).
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supporting Kansas’s position. 107 Baxstrom was discussed and specifically cited by Carla
Stovall, Attorney General of the State of Kansas, in her oral argument to the Court.108 And
when Thomas Weilert began his oral argument on behalf of Leroy Hendricks, he completed
only five sentences before he was interrupted by a question asking about the applicability of
Baxstrom to the case then before the Court.109 A justice asked: “Well, didn’t the Court in
Baxstrom uphold essentially the notion that the State could commit people after they were
released from prison in a civil commitment proceeding?”110 Mr. Weilert answered: “I
believe the Court upheld that they could commit after a–pardon me. After a criminal
sentence if they were mentally ill, yes, Your Honor.”111 The answer was unfortunate and
unilluminating.
Baxstrom was discussed and specifically cited by Justice Thomas in his majority
opinion in Hendricks112 and by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion.113 But in each

107

Amicus Brief for the State of Wisconsin at 8 n.4, id. (Nos. 95-1649 & 95-9075)
(asserting that adequate procedural rights are provided in the SVP civil commitment
process); Amicus Brief for the Menninger Foundation at 21, id. (No. 95-1649) (asserting
that Baxstrom permits civil commitment of sentence-expiring convicts).
108

Record at 7, id. (Nos. 95-1649 & 95-9075) (asserting that Baxstrom permits civil
commitment of sentence-expiring convicts).
109

Record at 33, id.

110

Id.

111

Id.

112

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369.

113

Id. at 372 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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instance, Baxstrom was misused; its precedent distorted. Justice Thomas, for example,
asserted that in Baxstrom, “we expressly recognized that civil commitment could follow
the expiration of a prison term.”114 Justice Thomas neglected to mention, however, that
Baxstrom prohibits the commitment process for sentence-expiring convicts to be
distinguished from the process used for all others undergoing civil commitment. In
Baxstrom, the Court specifically held that “no conceivable basis [exists] for distinguishing
the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from all other civil
commitments.”115
Would Justice Thomas also apply his revisionist analysis to Brown v. Board of
Education to assert that public schools may be racially segregated so long as they provide
equal education, ignoring the Supreme Court’s finding that “[s]eparate educational facilities
are inherently unequal”?116 If Topeka, Kansas was not permitted to discriminate against
similarly situated persons in 1954, the state of Kansas should not have been permitted to do
so in 1997.
Separate categorization of sentence-expiring convicts for civil commitment
purposes could not withstand even the lowest level, rational basis equal protection scrutiny

114

Id. at 369. Justice Kennedy made the same point. Id. at 372 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
115

Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111-12 (1966).

116

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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in 1966. It should not be able to withstand a heightened level of scrutiny today.117 In
Foucha v. Louisiana,118 decided three years before Hendricks, The Supreme Court
identified freedom from physical restraint as the core liberty interest protected by the
Constitution from arbitrary governmental action.119 It is difficult to understand how the
core liberty interest protected by the Constitution could be characterized as anything less
than fundamental.120

117

Strict scrutiny equal protection analysis was first articulated in 1942. Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Intermediate or mid-level
scrutiny, which some authors have suggested is appropriate for SVP commitment
legislation, was first recognized in 1976, ten years after Baxstrom was decided. Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that “the relatively
deferential ‘rational basis’ standard of review normally applied takes on a sharper focus
when [the Court addresses] a gender-based classification.”).
118

504 U.S. 71 (1992).

119

Id. at 80. The Supreme Court has ruled that even sentence-serving convicts have a
liberty interest that protects them against unwarranted administrative transfer from a prison,
where they are punished, to a mental hospital, where they are treated involuntarily for their
psychiatric condition. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980).
120

In Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Supreme
Court noted that whenever “legislation . . . involves one of the basic civil rights of man,
. . . strict scrutiny of the classification . . . is essential, lest unwittingly or otherwise
invidious discriminations are made against groups or types of individuals in violation of the
constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws.” Id. at 541.
Despite such pronouncements, one critic of Supreme Court equal protection
analysis described it as a “crazy quilt approach” that “lack[s] coherence and consistency.”
John Marquez Lundin, Making Equal Protection Analysis Make Sense, 49 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1191, 1192-93 (1999). He noted that “the Court seems to observe some of its rules
of equal protection analysis more in the breach than otherwise.” Id. at 1193. The Court’s
equal protection decision making has been strongly criticized, not just by numerous
scholars, id. at 1194 n.12 (citing authorities), but also by the justices themselves. Id. at
1194 n.13 (quoting statements of Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens, Justice Marshall, and
Chief Justice Burger).
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In Foucha, the Supreme Court held: “Freedom from physical restraint being a
fundamental right, the State must have a particularly convincing reason . . . for such
discrimination . . . .”121 And yet, in Hendricks, Justice Thomas did not consider whether
Kansas’s SVP commitment statutes deprived Hendricks of a fundamental right,122 and if so,

Some authors believe that Supreme Court decisions support application of an
intermediate level review of laws permitting involuntary civil commitment of insanity
acquittees, criminal defendants found permanently mentally incompetent to stand trial, and
SVPs. See, e.g., John Kip Cornwell, Confining Mentally Disordered “Super Criminals”:
A Realignment of Rights in the Nineties, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 651, 669-81
(1996)[hereinafter Cornwall, “Super Criminals”]; John Kip Cornwall, Protection and
Treatment: The Permissible Civil Detention of Sexual Predators, 53 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1293, 1316-19 (1996)[hereinafter Cornwall, Protection and Treatment]. Cornwell
proposes use of a “particularly exacting standard” for such cases. Cornwell, “Super
Criminals” at 679; Cornwall, Protection and Treatment at 1317-18. See also Brian G.
Bodine, Comment, Washington’s New Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System: An
Unconstitutional Law and an Unwise Policy Choice, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 105,
136 (1990) (asserting that courts should apply mid-level, heightened scrutiny to SVP equal
protection claims because SVPs are a quasi-suspect group.). But see In re Samuelson, 727
N.E.2d 228, 236 (Ill. 2000) (applying a rational basis test to an SVP equal protection
claim).
121

Id. at 86 (White, J., plurality opinion). Justice White wrote the majority opinion
for Parts I and II of Foucha, and a plurality opinion for Part III. The quotation is from Part
III. This language departs from the “strict scrutiny”/“rational basis” dichotomy traditionally
employed to review substantive due process and equal protection claims.
122

The Supreme Court has acknowledged that confinement for compulsory
psychiatric treatment is “a massive curtailment of liberty.” Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S.
504, 509 (1972). Those who are involuntarily hospitalized are categorized as “mental
patients” and are subjected to psychiatric treatment that probes their innermost thoughts
and to antipsychotic medication that dulls and alters those thoughts. Heller v. Doe, 509
U.S. 312, 324-25 (1993). Forced administration of antipsychotic medication during trial
may violate a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial. Riggins v. Nevada, 504
U.S. 127, 133-38 (1992). Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that under the due
process clause, even sentence-serving convicts possess “a significant liberty interest in
avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.” Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990). “The forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting
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whether such deprivation satisfies the test of strict scrutiny. Justice Thomas simply
accepted, at face value, the state’s categorization of SVP commitment as “civil” and
imposed upon Hendricks the heavy, if not impossible, burden of establishing by the clearest
proof, that the legislative scheme was punitive.123
VI. The 2000s: Sell v. United States124–What Promise?
Sell v. United States, decided in 2003, is the most recent Supreme Court case
considering mental disorder and the civil/criminal distinction. Unlike the cases previously
discussed in this article, the Sell case did not involve the classification of individuals for
involuntary commitment, but rather, involved the right of certain involuntarily committed
individuals to refuse treatment. Specifically, the Court in Sell considered whether the
government may administer antipsychotic medication to an incompetent criminal defendant
against his or her will in order to render the defendant competent to stand trial for a
nonviolent crime or whether forced administration of antipsychotic medication
unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of his or her liberty interest to reject medical

person's body represents a substantial interference with that person's liberty.” Id. at 229.
Involuntarily confined patients may also be subjected to mandatory behavior modification
programs. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980). People who are involuntarily
hospitalized because they are dangerous are stigmatized by that finding. See Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979). Such stigma “can have a very significant impact on
the individual.” Id. at 426.
123

Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).

124

539 U.S. 166 (2003).
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treatment.125
The Court upheld the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication
provided the treatment was medically appropriate, was substantially unlikely to have side
effects that could undermine the fairness of the trial, and was necessary to significantly
further important governmental, trial-related interests.126 Justice Breyer, writing for the
Court’s six-judge majority, 127 discussed these requirements in detail128 and opined that
instances of permissible forced medication solely to restore trial competence “may be
rare.”129 Nevertheless, the Sell majority held that the requirements that limit forced
medication to restore trial competence need not be considered if forced medication is
warranted for a different purpose–such as when the defendant is dangerous either to others

125

See id. at 169, 177.

126

Id. at 179.

127

Id. at 168. Justice Scalia, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice O’Connor and
Justice Thomas, id. at 186, asserted that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction because the
District Court’s order was neither a final decision nor an interlocutory order specified by
statute that would permit an appeal and a decision on the merits. Id. at 186-87 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The dissenters expressed concern that by allowing the appeal, the majority
would enable criminal defendant’s “to engage in opportunistic behavior” by voluntarily
taking medication until partway through trial and then abruptly refusing it while demanding
an interlocutory appeal from an order that the medication be continued on an involuntary
basis. Id. at 191 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128

Id. at 180-81.

129

Id. at 180.
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or to himself or herself.130 At two separate places in his opinion, 131 Justice Breyer
emphasized that these alternative grounds should be considered before the issue of forced
medication to restore trial competence is considered.132
The Sell majority asserted that two prior Supreme Court precedents–Riggins v.
Nevada133 and Washington v. Harper134–“set forth the framework” for the Sell decision.135
Justice Breyer, however, misstated and misapplied those cases, perverting their
precedential value. In Riggins, the Court reversed the conviction of a mentally competent
defendant who was involuntarily medicated during his criminal trial. The record failed to
establish that the administration of antipsychotic medication was necessary to accomplish
an essential state policy that would permit the state to override the defendant’s liberty
interest in freedom from unwanted medication136 and his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights to a fair trial.137
Because Riggins did not involve an incompetent defendant, the case did not

130

Id. at 181-82.

131

Id. at 181-82, 183.

132

Id.

133

504 U.S. 127 (1992).

134

494 U.S. 210 (1990).

135

Sell, 123 S. Ct. at 177-78.

136

Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137-38.

137

Id. at 138.
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establish the substantive standards that govern the forced medication of incompetent
defendants. In fact, the Riggins majority specifically acknowledged that “we have not had
occasion to develop substantive standards for judging forced administration of
[antipsychotic] drugs in the trial or pretrial settings.”138 The Riggins majority did, however,
suggest a standard that, in its words, “certainly would satisf[y] due process.”139 Due
process would be satisfied if the trial court finds that the compelled treatment is “medically
appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of [the
defendant’s] own safety or the safety of others.”140 Additionally, the Riggins majority
opined that due process “might” be satisfied if the compelled treatment is medically
appropriate and an adjudication of guilt or innocence cannot be obtained using less intrusive
means.141 These gratuitous comments involved speculation on a question that was not
before the Court for decision, and thus, were purely dicta. Nevertheless, with little more
consideration of the issue, the Sell majority adopted these comments as its holding for
incompetent defendants.
The Sell majority’s reliance on Washington v. Harper142 is even more dubious.

138

Id. at 136. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas asserted that the Riggins’
majority “appears to adopt a standard of strict scrutiny.” Id. at 156 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
The majority denied the assertion. Id. at 136.
139

Id. at 135.

140

Id.

141

Id.

142

494 U.S. 210 (1990).
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Harper involved a sentence-serving convict, not an incompetent defendant awaiting trial.
The Harper Court held: “[G]iven the requirements of the prison environment, the Due
Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness
with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and
the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”143 Further, the Harper Court ruled that
the prisoner was not entitled to a judicial hearing to determine whether he was competent
to refuse medication144 and upheld administrative hearing procedures in which a hearing
committee, composed of a psychiatrist, psychologist, and the associate superintendent of
the facility,145 reviews the medical treatment decision.146
The Harper Court, relying upon the state’s legitimate interest in reducing danger
posed by prisoners in the prison environment,147 specifically distinguished sentence-

143

Id. at 227 (emphasis added).

144

Id. at 222, 226, 228.

145

Id. at 215. Harper was confined in the Special Offender Center, a Department of
Corrections correctional institute established “to diagnose and treat convicted felons with
serious mental disorders.” Id. at 214.
146

Id. at 232-33. The committee reviews the medical decision that the prisoner has a
mental disorder that is likely to cause harm if not treated and that treatment is in the
prisoner’s medical interests given the legitimate need of the prisoner’s institutional
confinement. See id. at 222.
147

Id. at 225. Less than a year after its Harper decision, however, the Court hinted
that its Harper precedent might be applicable to a treatment refusal situation that did not
involve prison security. In Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (per curiam), the Court
vacated a Louisiana trial court decision that had ordered a death row inmate to be treated
involuntarily with antipsychotic medication to restore him to competency to be executed.
See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 747 (La. 1992). The Supreme Court ordered
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serving prisoner mental patients from all other involuntarily confined mental patients.
“There are few cases,” wrote Justice Kennedy for the majority, “in which the State’s
interest in combating the danger posed by a person to both himself and others is greater
than in a prison environment.”148 Because prisoners have “a demonstrated proclivity for
antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct,”149 the state’s interest in combating danger
posed by prisoners–both to themselves and to others–is greater in the prison environment
than elsewhere.150

reconsideration in light of Harper. Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. at 38. Although Perry was
a prisoner, there was no proof that without medication he was dangerous to himself or
others. Was the Court suggesting that mentally disordered prisoners cannot be treated
involuntarily if they are not dangerous? Was the Court suggesting that dangerousness is not
the only justification for treatment of mentally disordered prisoners? Was the Court
suggesting that proof of dangerousness may justify involuntary treatment of mentally
disordered nonprisoners? On remand, the trial court reinstated its order, but the Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 747, 771. The Louisiana Supreme
Court distinguished Harper, holding that the involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medication for the purpose of restoring competence for execution “does not constitute
medical treatment, but forms part of the capital punishment sought to be executed by the
state.” Id. at 753. The court found violations of both the state and federal constitutions.
Id. at 755.
148

Harper, 494 U.S. at 225.

149

Id. (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)).

150

Id. A prison regulation that is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests will be upheld as valid even if it infringes on prisoners’ constitutional rights. Id. at
223 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). The validity of a prison regulation
will be measured by the “reasonable relationship” standard even when the infringed
constitutional right is fundamental and a more rigorous standard of review would have been
required in nonprison settings. Id. (citing O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349
(1987)).
Harper asserted that the state’s failure to provide him with a judicial hearing on his
competence to refuse medication before administering antipsychotic medication over his
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Two years after Harper, Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court’s majority in
Riggins, explained that “the unique circumstances of penal confinement”151 were crucial to
the Harper Court’s decision to allow the state to involuntary administer antipsychotic
medication to dangerous, mentally disordered, sentence-serving prisoners. Charles Sell,
however, was not a sentence-serving prisoner. This dentist was an incompetent criminal
defendant charged with mail fraud, Medicaid fraud, and money laundering.152 Because he
had not yet been convicted of those crimes, he could not be subjected to the unique
circumstances of penal confinement. He may be innocent of those crimes, and, in fact, the
law presumes his innocence.153 For the Sell majority to rule that Harper’s holding and

objection violated the due process, equal protection, and free speech clauses of both the
federal and state constitutions, as well as state tort law which requires informed consent to
treatment. Id. at 217. The Supreme court’s Harper opinion addressed only the due process
issue. Nevertheless, if due process can be satisfied by a prison regulation that is reasonably
related to the state’s legitimate penological interest in prison safety and security even when
it infringes on a prisoner’s fundamental constitutional rights, it is unlikely that equal
protection and free speech claims, even if independently and fully considered by the Court,
would have succeeded.
151

Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992).

152

Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 170 (2003).

153

Because the incompetent defendant has not been tried for the crime charged
against him or her, the defendant retains the status of any accused, but not convicted,
criminal defendant. Criminal defendants are presumed innocent until they are convicted.
As Justice Stevens noted: “Prior to conviction every individual is entitled to the benefit of
a presumption . . . that he is innocent of prior criminal conduct . . . .” Bell v . Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 582 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503
(1976) (“The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a
basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice.”); Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that there is a presumption of innocence
in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement
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rationale for forced medication of sentence-serving prisoners is equally applicable to
Charles Sell and to other criminal defendants is ludicrous.
If Riggins, which involved a competent criminal defendant, and Harper, which
involved a sentence-serving convict, provide an inadequate framework for analyzing the
right of incompetent criminal defendants to refuse antipsychotic medication, are there
other Supreme Court precedents that provide a better analytic framework? The answer is:
“yes,” and the cases are Baxstrom and Jackson. Although neither case involved a patient’s
right to refuse treatment, both involved the question of the patient’s status, a question that
must be resolved before the patient’s rights as a patient can be considered.

In

Baxstrom, the Court held that when a prisoner’s sentence expires, he or she is no longer a
sentence-serving convict. If the sentence-expiring prisoner’s mental disorder necessitates
involuntary hospitalization, he or she can not be distinguished from any other person
undergoing the civil commitment process.154 If the sentence-expiring prisoner is
committed, he or she is a civil patient. In Jackson, the Court applied its Baxstrom
precedent to permanently incompetent criminal defendants. They, too, cannot be separately
categorized for commitment purposes. The civil commitment process used to involuntarily
detain any other citizen must be used to involuntarily detain a permanently incompetent

lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”).
154

Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 110-12 (1966). See supra text accompanying
notes 8-16.
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criminal defendant.155 If the incompetent defendant is committed, he or she is a civil
patient. These two decisions maintain the civil/criminal distinction; the Sell decision does
not.
If permanently incompetent criminal defendants are civil patients, then criminal
defendants whose competence is not permanent are also civil patients. Both are accused,
but not convicted, of crime. Though their potential for restoration to trial competence may
differ, their nonconvict, nonprisoner status is identical.
The Sell Court did not consider the implications of the Baxstrom and Jackson
precedents on the patient status of incompetent criminal defendants. Neither Baxstrom nor
Jackson were discussed or even cited. In 1999, Charles Sell was institutionalized in the
United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri, as
incompetent to stand trial.156 He remained in that institution and in that patient status in
2003, when the Supreme Court decided the Sell case. Although Jackson forbids the
lengthy confinement of an incompetent defendant as an incompetent defendant,157 the Sell
Court did not question the propriety of Charles Sell’s four-year confinement as an
incompetent defendant and his continued confinement in that patient status.158 The Sell

155

Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 724, 730, 738 (1972). See supra text
accompanying notes 25-32.
156

Sell, 539 U.S. at 170-71.

157

Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. See supra text accompanying note 31.

158

A review of legislation in the fifty states and the District of Columbia, conducted
twenty years after Jackson was decided, revealed that the Supreme Court’s decision has
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majority simply acknowledged that Sell had already been confined “for a long period of
time, and that his refusal to take antipsychotic drugs might result in further lengthy
confinement”159–factors that would diminish the importance of the government’s interest in
prosecuting Sell.160 One might well ask whether Jackson has been overruled sub
silencio.161

been ignored or circumvented in a majority of jurisdictions. See Morris and Meloy, supra
note 24, at 13-33. Some states ignore Jackson by continuing to allow incompetent
defendants to be detained until their competence has been restored. Id. at 13. Others evade
Jackson by imposing a lengthy period of treatment before acknowledging that the
defendant is permanently incompetent, i.e., that there is no substantial probability that the
defendant will become competent to stand trial in the foreseeable future. Id. at 15-18.
Several states tie the maximum length of the treatment period to the maximum sentence
that could have been imposed if the defendant was convicted of the crime charged. Id. at
17-18. In California, permanently incompetent criminal defendants can be placed on
mental health conservatorships using different criteria than are used to establish mental
health conservatorships for all other mentally disordered people. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §§ 5350, 5008(h)(1)(A)-(B) (West 1998). By law, other conservatees must be
placed in the least restrictive placement. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358(a)(1)(A). In
contrast, by law, permanently incompetent criminal defendant conservatees must be placed
in a facility “that achieves the purposes of treatment of the conservatee and protection of
the public.” CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358(a)(1)(B).
The failure to individualize placement may violate a patient’s right to placement in
the least restrictive appropriate treatment setting. See Perlin, supra note 53, at 231-34
(asserting that the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999),
interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act, may require individualized placement
decisionmaking for permanently incompetent criminal defendants and other forensic
patients, rather than uniform placement in maximum security institutions).
159

Sell, 539 U.S. at 186.

160

See id. at 180 (requiring that important governmental interests be at stake), 186
(suggesting that lengthy pretrial detention diminishes the importance of the government’s
interest in prosecuting the defendant).
161

In mentioning the possibility that Sell might be subjected to “further lengthy
confinement,” perhaps the majority only meant to suggest that if Sell was not medicated, he
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If incompetent criminal defendants are civil patients, then they are entitled to the
same right to medical self-determination that other civil patients possess. In many states,
courts have held that civilly committed patients have a right to refuse treatment
with antipsychotic medication unless they lack the capacity to make treatment
decisions–i.e., to weigh the risks, benefits, and alternatives to the proposed medication. 162
Civilly committed patients–including incompetent criminal defendants–are not similarly
situated with mentally disordered, sentence-serving prisoners whose right to refuse
treatment is governed by their danger to themselves and others, not their capacity to

would be found permanently incompetent to stand trial, and, pursuant to Jackson, could
confined thereafter through the civil commitment process. Nevertheless, the majority
failed to consider: (1) whether detention for four years as an incompetent criminal
defendant is permissible under Jackson, and (2) whether detention beyond four years as an
incompetent criminal defendant is permissible under Jackson.
162

See, e.g., Riese v. St. Mary’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201, 210
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that in nonemergency situations, antipsychotic medication
cannot be administered to involuntarily committed civil patients without their consent
absent a judicial determination of their incapacity to make treatment decisions); Rogers v.
Comm’r, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Mass. 1983) (holding that involuntarily committed civil
patients do not lose the right to make treatment decisions unless they are adjudicated
incompetent by a judge in incompetency proceedings); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337,
342, 342-44 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that involuntary civil commitment, without more, does
not establish that the committed person lacks the mental capacity to comprehend the
consequences of medication refusal decisions and that a judicial determination that the
patient lacks that capacity is required before the state may administer antipsychotic drugs
over the patient’s objection). Utilizing the informed consent doctrine, “virtually every
court that has considered the matter now recognizes a ‘right to refuse’ psychotropic
medication for institutionalized populations.” RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 923 (4th ed. 2004).
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understand the consequences of the proposed therapy. 163
In fact, because civilly committed patients have been confined without a criminal
trial and without a criminal conviction, special deference should be paid to their decisions
to refuse treatment. The state has exercised its authority to detain them because of their
predicted dangerousness or inability to provide for themselves. The state’s legitimate
interest in protecting them, and in protecting others from them, is achieved by the
confinement itself–without coerced treatment. If the confined individual competently
chooses to refuse treatment, even if such decision may prolong his or her confinement, the
individual’s interest–one that the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized to be a
significant, constitutionally protected liberty interest164–should outweigh any claimed
governmental interest in coercing treatment.
One cannot assume that a criminal defendant who is incompetent to stand trial is
necessarily incompetent to make treatment decisions. The issue for competence to stand
163

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225 (1990). See supra text accompanying
notes 147-51. But see Morris, Confusion of Confinement, supra note 19, at 661-63
(asserting that when a mentally disordered prisoner is transferred from a prison to a mental
hospital for treatment of his or her mental disorder, punishment for the crime that led to
imprisonment is suspended, and therefore, the prisoner should not be distinguished from
any other patient treated in that hospital. Security measures should depend on the
pathology and severity of the individual’s mental disorder, not on the individual’s status as a
prisoner.).
164

Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22 (holding that under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a mentally ill prisoner “possesses a significant liberty interest in
avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs”); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S.
127, 135 (1992) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the forcing of
antipsychotic drugs on criminal defendants held for trial “absent a finding of overriding
justification and a determination of medical appropriateness”).
-43-

https://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art18

44

Morris:

trial is whether the defendant is able to understand the criminal proceedings and to assist in
his or her defense. The issue for competence to refuse antipsychotic medication is
whether the individual can weigh the risks, benefits, and alternatives to the proposed
medication. Because the issues are different, a defendant who is incompetent for one
purpose may be competent for another.165
Competent civil patients, however, do not have an absolute right to refuse
antipsychotic medication. The state does have a legitimate interest in protecting other
patients and staff from dangerous mental patients. This danger, however, is far less in a
mental hospital than it is in a prison.166 Unlike prisons, mental hospitals have professional
and support staff trained in dealing with problems of potential violence. Hospital staff may
respond to threatening situations using alternative approaches such as segregation, physical
restraints, psychotherapy, and behavior therapy. 167 At most, all that is needed is authority to
involuntarily sedate the patient in an emergency situation, when the patient presents an
immediate danger to himself or herself or to others.168 Nevertheless, this exercise of the

165

See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 413 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(asserting: “A person who who is ‘competent’ to play basketball is not thereby ‘competent’
to play the violin. . . . Competency for one purpose does not necessarily translate to
competency for another purpose.”).
166

See Bruce J. Winick, New Directions in the Right to Refuse Mental Health
Treatment: The Implications of Riggins v. Nevada, 2 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 205,
228-29 (1993).
167

Id.

168

See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5332(e) (West Supp. 2004) (authorizing
coerced treatment in an emergency). Another California statute defines an emergency as “a
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state’s police power must end when the emergency that warranted this exercise of authority
ends. If a person’s “significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of
antipsychotic drugs”169 is to have any meaning at all, a claim that the patient was committed
as being too dangerous to live in society, or that he or she presents a generalized danger to
other patients or staff in the institution, should not be useable as an excuse to authorize
nonemergency, coerced treatment of a competent civil patient.
In Sell, however, the Supreme Court eschews this analysis. Justice Breyer
correctly notes that involuntary medical treatment is typically addressed as a civil matter,
and that every state provides for the appointment of a guardian who may make a medication
decision for a patient who has been found incompetent to make that decision. 170 But then

situation in which action to impose treatment over the person’s objection is immediately
necessary for the preservation of life or the prevention of serious bodily harm to the
patient or others, and it is impracticable to first gain consent.” Id. § 5008(m) (West
1998).
169

See Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22 (holding that under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, even a mentally ill prisoner “possesses a significant liberty
interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs”).
170

Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 182 (2003). The Court also asserts, far more
questionably, that the guardian decides to authorize treatment when to do so is in the
patient’s best interests. Id. Several courts, however, have held that the guardian’s
responsibility is to decide the question of acceptability of treatment on the basis of how the
patient would have decided that question if the patient was competent. In other words, the
guardian is to apply a “substituted judgment” model, not a “best interest” model. See, e.g.,
In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 750 (D.C. 1979); In re Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 51-52 (Mass.
1981). Thus, for example, if the patient is a practicing Christian Scientist, the incompetent
patient, if competent, would refuse treatment even if it was in his or her best interest to
accept it, and under a “substituted judgment” model, the guardian should not consent to its
imposition upon the patient.
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he adds that “courts, in civil proceedings, may authorize involuntary medication where the
patient’s failure to accept treatment threatens injury to the patient or others.”171 As
authority for this proposition, Justice Breyer does not cite any state statutes or state court
decisions. Rather, he cites a federal regulation that implements a federal statute.172 The
statute is a federal civil commitment law, authorizing the detention of dangerous, sentenceexpiring prisoners and dangerous, incompetent criminal defendants against whom all
criminal charges have been dismissed.173 The statute, which establishes a special civil
commitment process solely for these two patient categories, appears to contravene
Baxstrom and Jackson. It was not applicable to Charles Sell because the criminal charges
against him had not been dismissed. Even if the statute was valid and was applicable to Sell,
the statute says nothing about the government’s authority to coerce treatment on those who
are confined.
The federal regulation cited as authority by Justice Breyer does not implement or
even pertain to the special commitment process established by the cited statute, but rather,
to forced medication of patients after they have been committed. The regulation provides
for a hearing by a psychiatrist to determine whether coerced treatment “is necessary
because the inmate is dangerous to self or others.” And yet, the Sell majority uncritically

171

Sell, 539 U.S. at 182.

172

Id., citing 28 C.F.R. § 549.43 (2003); 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (2000).

173

18 U.S.C. § 4246(a)(2000). The statute authorizes federal commitment only
when suitable arrangements for state custody are not available. Id.
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accepts this arguably inappropriate regulation as its sole authority to support its ruling that
a court may grant permission, on “Harper-type grounds”174 to forcibly medicate dangerous
criminal defendants who are competent to make treatment decisions in nonemergency
situations.
Ignoring the criminal defendant’s liberty interest in refusing medication, the
majority simply notes that “the inquiry into whether medication is permissible . . . to render
an individual nondangerous is usually more ‘objective and manageable’ than the inquiry into
whether medication is permissible to render a defendant competent.”175 The majority adds
that “medical experts may find it easier” to express an informed opinion on whether
particular medications “are medically appropriate and necessary to control a patient’s
potentially dangerous behavior . . . than to try to balance harms and benefits related to the
more quintessentially legal questions of trial fairness and competence.”176 Through the Sell
decision, a nonconvict’s significant liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic medication is
lost as the distinction between civil and criminal evaporates; the line between the mad and
the bad disappears. Objectivity and manageability of the inquiry plus ease of
adjudication–in other words, expediency–trumps an individual’s supposedly

174

Sell, 539 U.S. at 183.

175

Id. at 182.

176

Id.
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constitutionally protected liberty interest.177
VII. Conclusion: Us v. Them
In an address to Congress a few days after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack,
President Bush informed the world: “Every nation in every region now has a decision to
make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.”178 We are at war, we were
informed, and any nation that harbors or supports terrorism will be regarded as a hostile
regime.179 It is us versus them.
In this fight against a concept–terrorism–instead of a country, we have changed the
rules of war. We claim a right to make preemptive strikes against foreign dictators who
might harbor weapons of mass destruction that might be used against us. Regime change, at
our discretion, is a viable foreign policy option. American citizens have been designated as
“enemy combatants” and held in secret military custody without any criminal charges filed

177

Ironically, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, wrote a
concurring and dissenting opinion in the Harper case, criticizing the majority for
authorizing the forced medication of mentally disordered, sentence-serving convicts.
Imposing psychotropic medication on prisoners to serve institutional concerns and
“institutional convenience eviscerates the inmate’s substantive liberty interest in the
integrity of his body and mind.” Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 249-50 (1990)
(Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
178

Transcript of President Bush’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress on
Thursday Night, September 20, 2001, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript.
179

Id.
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against them and without any trials to determine their guilt or innocence.180 NonAmericans,
captured in the fighting in Afghanistan, have been imprisoned indefinitely at Guantanamo,
without being accorded prisoner-of-war status.
Our war against terrorism is a war against those who commit violent acts. In our
quest for security against violence, it is easy to include as enemies mentally disordered
sentence-expiring convicts, mentally incompetent criminal defendants, and persons
acquitted of crime by reason of insanity. Although they do not qualify as religiously
inspired, foreign terrorists, nevertheless, we perceive them as dangerous, and can easily
qualify them as domestic terrorists. We are told that these individuals cannot be punished.
Sentence-expiring convicts have served their criminal sentences; incompetent criminal
defendants have not been tried, insanity acquittees have not been convicted. But we do not
accept what we are told. Although traditional civil commitment might enable us to treat
their mental disorder and their danger, we believe the time constraints typically placed on
such commitments make such an option inadequate. And so we substitute special civil
commitment for these individuals, a post-incarceration incarceration,181 cloaking our
180

But see Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 698-99 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. granted,
124 S.Ct. 1353 (Feb. 20, 2004) (No. 03-1027) (holding that the President lacked inherent
constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to detain an American citizen on American
soil outside a zone of combat, and that absent specific congressional authorization, the
Non-Detention Act prohibited the President's detention of an American citizen on
American soil as an “enemy combatant,” and that Congress's Authorization for Use of
Military Force Joint Resolution, passed shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001,
was not such an authorization).
181

The term “post incarceration incarceration” appears in a speech presented by
George Alexander in a symposium celebrating the eightieth birthday of Thomas S. Szasz,
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punishment agenda in long-term treatment garb.182 Does it surprise you to learn that only
two of the more than 500 California SVPs committed to Atascadero State Hospital since
the SVP law was enacted nine years ago have been conditionally released to the
community?183 And both of those patients underwent surgical castration before they were
released.184 Despite California’s multibillion dollar budget deficit, the state is currently
spending $377 million to construct a new facility at Coalinga in order to accommodate an
expanded SVP population of 1,500 when that facility opens in 2005.185
In the fifty years since the University of San Diego School of Law was established,
we have seen Supreme Court jurisprudence shift from the Warren Court’s liberal

M.D. George J. Alexander, The State’s Insatiable Need to Incarcerate Those Who
Frighten It, at http://www.szasz.com/alexanderremarks.html.
182

For example, Michael Perlin asserts that sexually violent predator legislation
“blur[s] the borderline between civil and criminal . . . [by enforcing] social control in
punitive ways under the guise of the beneficence of civil commitment.” The Supreme
Court’s Hendricks decision upholding the constitutionality of SVP legislation “has the
potential of transforming psychiatric treatment facilities into de facto prisons.” Michael L.
Perlin, “On Desolation Row”: The Blurring of the Borders Between Civil and Criminal
Mental Disability Law, and What It Means to All of Us, keynote address presented at the
annual meeting of the American Association of Psychiatry and the Law (Newport Beach,
CA, Oct.. 2002 ) (manuscript of address available from the author). See also Note,
Involuntary Commitment of Violent Sexual Predators, 111 HARV. L. REV. 259, 266
(1997) (asserting that after Hendricks, “the risk increases that a potentially lifelong
deprivation of liberty via the civil system will be imposed to serve goals traditionally and
rightfully reserved for the criminal system–retribution and deterrence”).
183

Telephone interview with Barrie Haffler, Public Relations Officer, Atascadero
State Hospital (Jan. 15, 2004).
184

Id.

185

Id.
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application of the Constitution to prohibit the special categorization of sentence-expiring
prisoners186 and permanently incompetent criminal defendants187 for civil commitment, to
the Burger and Rehnquist Court’s conservative application of the Constitution to permit the
special categorization of insanity acquittees188 and SVPs189 for civil commitment, and to
permit the coerced treatment of competent, though dangerous, criminal defendants.190 In a
post-September 11, 2001 America, at a time when we are obsessed with our desire for
security from potentially violent people, this trend away from protection of individual
rights is not likely to be reversed.191
Benjamin Franklin once observed, “He who sacrifices freedom for security is
neither free nor secure.”192 But to us, our founding father’s prescience seems passe. We
186

Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). See supra text accompanying notes 8-

20.
187

Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). See supra text accompanying notes 25-

33.
188

Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes

39-52.
189

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). See supra text accompanying notes
59-84, 89-123.
190

Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). See supra text accompanying notes

124-77.
191

For example, the California Supreme Court recently held that a sentence-expiring
convict who has been civilly committed under California’s Mentally Disordered Offender
law may be forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs even if he or she is competent to
refuse it, provided a court determines that the individual is dangerous within the meaning of
the state’s regular civil commitment statutes. In re Qawi, 81 P.3d 224, 240 (Cal. 2004).
192

See http://alcuweb.best.vwh.net /911/, quoting Benjamin Franklin.
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are not adversely affected by laws that specially categorize mentally disordered people who
have been involved in some way in the criminal process and whose release into society we
fear. Those laws protect us. After all, we know that we are not mentally disordered,
dangerous, or involved in the criminal process. And in today’s world, it is us versus them.
We fail to consider that when any person’s rights are lost, our Constitutional rule of law is
undermined. To the extent that the Supreme Court allows that to happen, the shepherd is
asleep. The distance between right and wrong has broken down.
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